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At the core of Kenneth Arrow’s classic 1963 essay on medical uncertainty 
is a claim that has failed to carry the day among economists. This claim — 
that physician adherence to an anti-competitive ethic of fidelity to patients 
and suppression of pecuniary influences on clinical judgment pushes med- 
ical markets toward social optimality — has won Arrow near-iconic status 
among medical ethicists (and many physicians). Yet conventional wisdom 
among health economists, including several participants in this sympo- 
sium, holds that this claim is either naïve or outdated. Health economists 
admire Arrow’s article for its path-breaking analysis of market failures 
resulting from information asymmetry, uncertainty, and moral hazard. But 
his suggestion that anticompetitive professional norms can compensate for 
these market failures is at odds with economists’ more typical treatment of 
professional norms as monopolistic constraints on contractual possibility. 
Arrow acknowledged that all indusrywide norms of conduct limit the 
options for economic exchange (Arrow 1972). For some commentators, the 
fact of such limits is proof enough of the perniciousness of professional 
norms from an efficiency perspective. Richard Posner (1993) treats the 
common “ideology” of guild members concerning matters of quality and 
craftsmanship as a tool for cartelizing production in order to serve the self- 
interest of members.1  Guild ideology, in this view, deceives both its own 
adherents and the public concerning members’ furtherance of their own 
 
1. Guild ideology, so interpreted, discourages would-be defectors and free riders by per- 
suading them that guild cooperation serves the public good and by shaming deviant guild mem- 
bers as self seeking. 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 26, No. 5, October 2001. Copyright © 2001 by 
Duke University Press. 
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interests at society’s expense, and guild norms that express this ideology 
do not deserve the law’s deference. To the contrary, suppression of com- 
petition through guild norms ought to be the object of legal attack. 
Nowhere did Arrow deny that physician adherence to the ethic of 
fidelity to patients and suppression of pecuniary influences at the bedside 
serves the medical profession’s self-interest. Indeed, implicit in Arrow’s 
account is a short-term/long-term tradeoff: physicians resist bedside finan- 
cial temptation case-by-case2  in order to reap reputational (and financial) 
rewards from the profession’s perceived adherence to this ethic. The norm 
of fidelity to patients is, by this account, a product of the marketplace. 
Arrow and critics who view this and other professional norms as pernicious 
from a social welfare perspective differ not over whether these norms 
reflect professional self-interest, but over whether they yield welfare gains 
or welfare losses by comparison with a hypothetical absence of such self- 
constraint. 
This difference of opinion is not merely academic. The question of how 
health care policy and law should treat professional ethics is key to a vari- 
ety of ongoing legal controversies. To the extent that health policy and law 
strive toward optimality in resource allocation, the social welfare impact 
of professional norms, including the ethic of fidelity to patients and sup- 
pression of pecuniary influences at the bedside, is an important public pol- 
icy matter. 
The effect of professional ethics norms on social welfare is most visibly 
an issue in antitrust law. Over the past twenty-five years, antitrust doctrine 
has come to treat professional norms with skepticism, as so-called naked 
restraints on trade (see Havighurst in this issue). Yet ethics norms have 
survived antitrust scrutiny through a variety of doctrines that enables 
defenders of these norms to argue that they advance consumer welfare or 
other public purposes,3  and the U.S. Supreme Court recently signaled an 
increased willingness to entertain such arguments.4 
 
2. As other participants in this symposium have noted, Arrow was also a realist about the 
extent of professional adherence to this ethic, which he acknowledged was sometimes honored 
in the breach. But it surely has some influence on clinical judgment, he insisted, and to the extent 
that it does it moves medical resource allocation in different directions than would physician 
decisions driven purely by short-term financial incentives. 
3. These doctrines include the worthy purpose exception, which permits open-ended argu- 
ments for the public policy value of a restraint; the rule of reason, which nominally calls for 
analysis of a restraint’s effects on competition but in practice entails assessment of a restraint’s 
effects upon consumer welfare; and the market failure defense, which allows restraints to stand 
if they represent welfare-enhancing responses to informational or other malfunctions in com- 
petitive markets. (See Havighurst in this issue.) 
4. In California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the 
Court overturned an FTC ruling against a professional association’s ethical rules governing 
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The implications of professional ethics norms for social welfare are at 
issue in other areas of law marked by tension between these norms and the 
market paradigm. Conflicts over the lawfulness of financial rewards to 
physicians for frugal practice, the authority of treating physicians versus 
health plan managers to determine medical need, and the supervisory pow- 
ers of plan managers over clinical practitioners pit professional norms 
against immediate market pressures. 
If the goal of health care policy and law is to maximize the social wel- 
fare yield from medical spending, consideration of the place of profes- 
sional ethics norms in health policy requires that we pose three questions. 
First, how can we distinguish between professional norms that enhance 
social welfare (even if “anticompetitive” in some sense5) and therefore 
merit our deference (and perhaps even some legal protection) and norms 
that reduce welfare? Second, when we conclude that a professional norm 
is socially undesirable, how should we go about choosing among regula- 
tory and legal strategies and deference to markets as means for dissolving 
the norm? Third, when we conclude that a professional norm is socially 
desirable, how should we go about preserving it? Should we defer to mar- 
ket outcomes — and perhaps shield select forms of professional collusion 
from antitrust intervention? Or should we defend this norm actively, 
through legal and regulatory intervention? 
This essay focuses on the first of these three questions, since it is the 
subject of Arrow’s article. From a public policy perspective, however, the 
second and third are just as important. It is hardly obvious that a socially 
undesirable norm should be targeted by judges or regulators rather than 
left to wither in the marketplace; nor is it clear that a socially desirable 
norm needs legal or regulatory support to survive. 
 
 
Arrow and the Market for Medical Ethics 
 
The idea that actors’ unrestrained pursuit of self-interest sometimes 
reduces social welfare was well accepted among economists in 1963, as 
Arrow noted in his article. But economists were disinclined to acknowl- 
 
 
members’ claims to the public about low fees and discounts. The justices offered a “market fail- 
ure” rationale, arguing that consumers are at high risk for misunderstanding professionals’ 
advertising claims and that ethical restraints that make such claims easier for consumers to 
grasp can therefore be “procompetitive.” 
5. I employ the word anticompetitive here not in its antitrust law sense, as a term of art to 
convey a mix of judgments about a practice’s effects upon both competition and consumer wel- 
fare (Hammer 2000), but in a more literal sense, to convey proscription of alternative competi- 
tive strategies inconsistent with professional norms. 
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edge that ungoverned self-interest, without negative externalities or 
monopoly power, could yield socially suboptimal results. The notion that, 
absent externalities, competing producers without market power might 
sometimes better advance social welfare by suppressing their self-interest 
boldy challenged conventional wisdom. 
Arrow’s explanation for the ethic of suppression of self-interest in med- 
icine put information problems front and center. Indeed, from the perspec- 
tive of academic economists, Arrow’s principal contribution in this article 
was his path-breaking analysis of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
as causes of market failure — and thus as reason for restraints on economic 
actors’ pursuit of self-interest. Arrow argued, in brief, that patients’ uncer- 
tainty about the effectiveness of medical care is a barrier to the mar- 
ketability of medical services. The classic market response to uncertainty 
and risk, he noted, is the offering of insurance against undesired outcomes, 
but for an array of technical reasons, a market for insurance for the out- 
comes of medical treatment has not developed and is unlikely to emerge soon. 
Without such insurance, Arrow contended, consumers who might bene- 
fit from medical care but are disinclined to bear the risk of poor results will 
demand medical services at socially suboptimal levels. Here is where the 
professional ethic of fidelity to patients and suppression of self-interest 
comes in. By making medical advice more trustworthy, Arrow suggested, 
this ethic compensates to some degree for consumers’ uncertainty about 
clinical outcomes and for their inability to purchase insurance against dis- 
appointing results. It thereby moves clinical demand toward socially opti- 
mal levels. 
The means by which this professional ethic is forged and sustained were 
nebulous in Arrow’s account. Arrow proposed that “when the market fails 
to achieve an optimal state, society will . . . recognize the gap, and non- 
market social institutions will arise attempting to bridge it” (947). He 
pointed to government as the classic example of such an institution6  but 
held that “in some circumstances other social institutions will step into the 
optimality gap” (947) and that medicine’s anticompetitive norms and orga- 
nizational forms are illustrative. Arrow, however, offered no theory to 
explain how nonmarket bridging occurs — to explain who identifies opti- 
mality gaps (based on what incentives) and how, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, these gaps are closed without the intervention of market forces. 
 
6. In so doing, Arrow aligned himself against what later carne to be known as public choice 
theory, which treats government as an alternative market venue and public policy as the out- 
come of bidding and negotiation among competing private interests, not as the product of a dis- 
interested quest to identify and compensate for market failures. 
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Later in his article, however, Arrow offered a different account, along 
mor e classic economic lines. Having pr esented the ethic of fidelity to 
patients and suppression of self-interest as a nonmarket response to con- 
sumer ignorance and uncertainty, he r echaracterized professional com- 
mitment to this ethic as, in essence, a long-term marketing strategy. Physi- 
cians make this commitment in order to win their patients’ confidence: 
thus this ethic is “part of the commodity the physician sells” (965; empha- 
sis added). 
Arrow’s parallel, market-based explanation presents physicians’ com- 
mitments to professional standards of care, suppression of self-interest, 
and avoidance of “the obvious stigmata of profit-maximizing” as signals of 
their “intentions to act as thoroughly in the buyer’s behalf as possible” 
(965). Because prospective buyers respond to these signals by purchasing 
medical care at increased levels, professional norms that reinforce such 
conduct and commitment are in physicians’ long-term, collective self- 
interest. These professional norms, in other words, reflect and reinforce a 
rational trade-off strategy that forgoes short-term opportunities for exploita- 
tion of consumer ignorance in order to win consumer trust and to thereby 
increase consumer demand over the long term. And because consumer 
reliance on medical advice yields net benefits (something Arrow was 
inclined to presume but that current commentators tend to question), 
physicians’ anticompetitive professional norms also enhance social wel- 
fare, Arrow held. 
This hard-nosed account of physicians’ anti-competitive norms has fared 
better over time with health policy commentators than has Arrow’s almost- 
mystical story of inexorable optimality-seeking by “nonmarket social 
institutions.” The rise of public choice theory — and of cynicism about the 
public-regarding potential of government in particular and other social 
institutions more generally — created an unfavorable intellectual climate 
for the proposition that nonmarket institutions can do other than function 
as venues for pursuit of private self-interest. Public choice theory denies 
that anything about the operation of these institutions tends toward social 
optimality, except by coincidence. Arrow’s failure to propose a mechanism 
in support of his contrary claim that such institutions detect and bridge 
optimality gaps may have made this claim more difficult to sustain in the 
face of public choice theory’s prevailing wind. On the other hand, Arrow’s 
market-based account of trust-inducing professional norms as “part of the 
commodity the physician sells” has taken root among scholars of health 
care law and policy. Not only did this interpretation fit the fundamental 
economics premise of pursuit of self-interest by rational actors; it squared 
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with historical accounts of the medical profession’s success, during the first 
half of the twentieth century, at suppressing practitioners’ commercial 
behavior, committing them to higher standards of care, and thereby win- 
ning greater consumer confidence (Starr 1982).7 
 
 
Arrow’s Doubts 
 
Although Arrow’s account of physicians’ anticompetitive norms stressed 
their social welfare–enhancing effects, he cautioned that noncompetitive 
physician behavior ensuing from adherence to these norms could interfere 
with the pursuit of optimality. “The social adjustment towards optimality,” 
he wrote, “puts obstacles in its own path” (947). With this caveat, Arrow 
acknowledged a thing often discounted in economics commentary: that 
institutions and mores understandable in functionalist terms, as adjust- 
ments tending toward efficiency, can exhibit adaptive inflexibilities, or 
structural constraints,8  that reduce social welfare. Such constraints can 
arise from human cognitive shortcomings, institutional rigidities, and the 
coherence of systems of social and moral belief. 
Arrow said nothing in his article about the ways by which the medical 
market’s anticompetitive features, including the professional ethic of sup- 
pression of self-interest and the institutions that reflect and reinforce this 
ethic, might interfere with progress toward optimality. Such interference 
was, for Arrow, a footnote to his story about the overall social welfare 
gains from this professional ethic. Yet during the generation or so that fol- 
lowed publication of Arrow’s essay, this footnote became one of the prin- 
cipal storylines in health care economics and law, eclipsing in influence 
Arrow’s case for the social welfare benefits of anticompetitive professional 
norms. 
 
7. Law-and-economics scholars broadened Arrow’s story about the marketing of indicia of 
trustworthiness as a response to consumer inability to assess results. Henry Hansmann (1980) 
interpreted the nonprofit form as an answer to what he termed “contract failure”— the diverse 
inabilities of patrons (whether charitable donors or paying customers) to knowledgeably moni- 
tor a firm’s performance to assess its compliance with patrons’ expectations. For Hansmann, the 
nonprofit form’s essential feature was its bar against distributing money (aside from compensa- 
tion at market rates) to stakeholders — a prohibition analogous to the professional ethic of sup- 
pression of financial self-interest. Along similar lines, Robert Cooter treated the law of fiduciary 
obligation as a tool for reinforcing principals’ confidence in agents’ reliability when principals 
cannot closely monitor agents’ exercise of discretion (Cooter and Freedman 1991). 
8. Neoclassical economists pursue functionalist explanations of social phenomena — that is, 
they seek to interpret behavior and institutions as adaptive responses to the environment — just 
as classical evolutionary theorists sought to explain the anatomy and physiology of organisms 
entirely in terms of adaptive purposes served. In economics, as in biology, there is a growing 
realization that adaptation to environmental pressures is often incomplete, due to limits (i.e., 
structural constraints) on the social and biological possibilities for change. 
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The Rising Tide of Skepticism 
 
Since the 1970s, a growing number of commentators from across the ideo- 
logical spectrum has cast the ethics of the medical profession as a program 
for self-interested restraint of trade. Arrow himself, as I noted earlier, 
acknowledged that all industrywide behavioral norms restrain trade by 
putting some contractual alternatives off limits (Arrow 1972). Whether a 
given restraint on commerce reduces (or enhances) social welfare is, as 
Arrow realized, a separate question. But some commentators seem to pre- 
sume that mere “discovery” that an ethical norm limits buyers’ and sellers’ 
options (and benefits sellers) is enough to establish the norm’s social unde- 
sirability. 
More sophisticated critics of professional ethics offer powerful argu- 
ments for the inefficiency of particular anticompetitive norms, including 
prohibitions against advertising, price competition, and contractual lower- 
ing of clinical standards of care (Blumstein 1994; Havighurst 1995). These 
critics tie the norms they target to lost opportunities for consumers to learn 
more about the quality and prices of alternative providers, to obtain equiv- 
alent services more cheaply, and to act on their own cost-benefit trade-off 
preferences by choosing lower levels of care at lower cost. These argu- 
ments have had large real world impact. Invoking antitrust law, courts have 
rejected collaborative price-setting and ethical proscriptions against pro- 
fessional advertising as impermissible restraints on trade. A variety of legal 
protections for professional self-governance, including the rule against the 
“corporate practice of medicine,” have fallen by the wayside, and use of 
financial incentives to both promote and deter physician utilization of clin- 
ical services has become widespread. 
Consideration of the social welfare implications of professional norms 
can now draw upon a new body of research and scholarship that aspires to 
explain the origins and persistence of informal, nonlegal  norms in myriad 
settings. Robert Ellickson’s (1991) theory of welfare-maximizing norms — 
his hypothesis that “members of a close-knit group develop and maintain 
norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that 
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another”— is arguably 
consistent with portrayals of physicians’ ethical norms as self-serving 
restraints on trade. Ellickson and his followers have studied a variety of 
close-knit groups, from Shasta County cattlemen in California to diamond 
traders in New York, identifying governing, nonlegal norms and offering 
persuasive arguments for these norms’ efficiency within these communi- 
ties. The medical profession to some degree resembles these close-knit 
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groups, which sustain their nonlegal norms through peer feedback, gossip, 
and reputational sanctions. But divisions among physicians arising from 
specialization, geography, status, and institutional arrangements make sus- 
tenance of self-serving norms through informal feedback, gossip, and sanc- 
tions more problematic. These informal behavior control mechanisms are 
crucial to close-knit groups’ ability to maintain norms that maximize mem- 
bers’ aggregate welfare, in Ellickson’s account. Groups insufficiently cohe- 
sive for these mechanisms to work thus fall outside the ambit of Ellickson’s 
model. 
There is good reason to suspect that the medical profession has become 
less cohesive since publication of Arrow’s article. Physicians practice today 
within much more diverse institutional and financial contexts. Multispe- 
cialty group practices, myriad arrangements with health plans and provider 
networks, and highly variable economic incentives exist alongside the solo 
and small group fee-for-service model that was the norm in 1963. A more 
tangible sign of the profession’s diminished cohesiveness is the increased 
willingness of physicians to testify against their peers, on plaintiffs’ behalf, 
in medical malpractice suits, which were rare before the 1960s in large part 
because of physicians’ distaste for testifying against each other. If Ellick- 
son is right about the crucial role of group cohesion in the creation and 
maintenance of norms that maximize a group’s aggregate welfare, then the 
medical profession may no longer be capable of sustaining ethical norms 
that maximize its welfare. 
The medical profession’s internal cleavages also cast doubt on the notion 
that any one set of norms can maximize the welfare of all or most physi- 
cians. The profession has become a complex mix of overlapping subgroups 
with both shared and competing interests. Norms that might maximize one 
subgroup’s common interests might yield less desirable results for another 
subgroup or for the profession as a whole. Conversely, norms that maxi- 
mize interests shared by most of the profession might yield unwanted 
results for particular subgroups. 
It is thus hardly clear that traditional physician ethics — including the 
norm of fidelity to patients and suppr ession of financial self-inter est — 
maximize the medical profession’s aggregate welfare, let alone society’s. 
Recent efforts to explain the persistence of nonlegal norms in terms of 
their expr essive function cast further doubt on the thesis that physician 
norms maximize the profession’s (or society’s) welfar e. It has been sug- 
gested that people often abide by social norms to signal their cooperative 
natur e, and thus their desirability as potential partners in collaborative 
effort, irrespective of whether the norms being followed and thereby sus- 
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tained yield benefits that outweigh their costs (Posner 1998). Once a norm 
is fixed in place, by common understanding, as such a signal, it is difficult 
to dislodge even if it is wasteful in the aggregate to the group that abides 
by it as a signal — and even if adherence to an alternative norm could, in 
theory, perform this signaling function at lower cost. To the extent that 
physician norms perform this signaling function, their persistence cannot 
be taken as evidence that they maximize the profession’s welfare; it may 
mer ely r eflect the difficulty of shifting to an alternative,  agr eed-upon 
symbol. 
The upshot is that recent thinking about the social welfare impact of 
physicians’ anticompetitive norms is deeply skeptical of Arrow’s assertion 
that these norms have desirable welfare effects. Indeed, contemporary law- 
and-economics models for the creation and sustenance of social norms 
invite doubt about whether physicians’ anticompetitive norms further the 
medical profession’s aggregate welfare. On the other hand, these models 
do not support the sweeping conclusion that physicians’ anticompetitive 
norms, including the ethic of fidelity to patients, are socially wasteful per 
se. I turn next to some ideas about how we might sort out this confusing 
picture for some of the anticompetitive medical ethics norms most at issue 
today. 
 
 
A Dynamic  Model of the Market 
for Medical Ethics 
 
I start with a premise favorable toward economic analysis: that it makes no 
sense to speak, without explanation, of a tendency for nonmarket means, 
including ethical norms, to emerge and to fill optimality gaps that ensue 
from market imperfections. Arrow’s contribution toward our understand- 
ing of professional ethics was not his almost-mystical invocation of “non- 
market” forces tending toward optimality; it was his bold but down-to- 
earth proposition that an ethical commitment to fidelity to patients and 
suppression of pecuniary self-interest is “part of the commodity the physi- 
cian sells.” Whether or not one accepts Arrow’s further claim that “sale” 
of this commitment moves society toward optimality, his account of a mar- 
ket for ethical commitment as a response to consumer uncertainty about 
medical outcomes is intuitively appealing and compatible with the premise 
of self-interested actors. It is also consistent with the medical profession’s 
success, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, at 
increasing its prestige, credibility, and income as it restrained practition- 
ers’ commercial excesses. 
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Indeed, Arrow arguably underestimated consumer demand for profes- 
sional commitment to an ethic of devotion to patients and suppression of 
self-interest. In looking exclusively to consumer uncertainty about medi- 
cine’s biological efficacy as the source of consumer demand for pro- 
fessional trustworthiness, Arrow neglected the affective dimension of 
patients’ experience of illness — their yearnings for support and comfort, 
reassurance, and credible explanation of frightening developments. To the 
extent that sick patients value trusting relationships with their doctors as a 
way to cope with these emotional needs, Arrow’s exclusive focus on con- 
sumer information deficits undervalues consumer desire for the ethical 
commitment he seeks to explain. 
Arrow’s characterization of this ethical commitment in static terms, as 
part of a market equilibrium, missed dynamic features of the market for 
medical ethics that play a large role in ongoing health systems change. 
Over the past hundred or so years, physician commitment to the ethic of 
suppression of self-interest for the sake of patients has fluctuated consid- 
erably, almost certainly in response to changing demand-side pressures. At 
the dawn of the twentieth century, competing clinicians were hardly 
reserved about their entrepreneurial pursuits and claims for remedies. The 
raucous commercialism parodied in George Bernard Shaw’s The Doctor’s 
Dilemma undermined consumers’ belief in the value of what the healing 
professions had to offer. But by the second decade of the twentieth century 
the medical profession was responding aggressively to its image problem 
by closing proprietary medical schools, cracking down on clinical com- 
mercialism, and presenting its ethical commitments as evidence of superi- 
ority over other kinds of clinical practitioners (Starr 1982). By the time 
Arrow published his article, patient confidence in the medical profession 
had risen from an abysmal low to a historic high. Physicians, in short, iden- 
tified and met a previously unfulfilled consumer “demand” for trustwor- 
thiness. 
Yet having won consumers’ confidence, American physicians were, by 
1963, under less market pressure to “prove” their trustworthiness. Many 
took opportunistic advantage by acquiring ownership interests in hospitals, 
clinical laboratories, and other health care businesses. Anticommercial 
norms that Arrow treated as part of a lasting equilibrium fell by the way- 
side as physicians advertised aggressively and stopped providing free and 
discounted care to the poor. The profession, in short, began to drift back 
toward the commercialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies. 
I have suggested elsewhere that growing consumer awareness of this 
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drift (and consumer skepticism about claims that physicians are little moti- 
vated by money) opened the way for managed health plans to be explicit, 
in the 1980s and 1990s, about financial rewards to physicians for limiting 
care (Bloche 1998). The managed care revolution has transformed the 
market for medical ethics. The involvement of health care payers in clini- 
cal decision making introduced a cost-sensitive buyers’ perspective that 
differs from the vantage point of sick patients. From the payers’ perspec- 
tive, physician responsiveness to financial incentives is not problematic, 
either ethically or clinically, and division of physician loyalties between 
health plans and patients is acceptable, even desirable (Berenson 1991). On 
the other hand, the managed care “backlash” of the last few years suggests 
growing consumer unhappiness over economic arrangements that are at 
odds with the ideal of undivided physician loyalty to patients. Whether the 
medical profession will respond to market pressure for a return to more 
robust professional commitment to this ideal remains uncertain. What is 
clear, though, is that the constellation of ethical norms that Arrow’s article 
treated as a market equilibrium arose, in fact, through a dynamic process in 
which both physician willingness to suppress self-interest and consumer 
concerns about doctors’ trustworthiness changed over time. 
This dynamism remodels medical ethics in response to changing market 
pressures and market actors’ shifting perceptions. The landscape of ethical 
obligation has changed dramatically since 1963. Physicians now routinely 
advertise, accept discounted fees from managed health plans, take owner- 
ship interests in facilities financially affected by clinical utilization patterns, 
and sign contracts that reward them financially for withholding care. Yet 
many physicians at least say they remain committed to the ethic of undi- 
vided loyalty to patients (Sulmasy et al. 2000). A difficult but pertinent ques- 
tion is whether the constellation of anticompetitive norms Arrow identified 
should be treated as indivisible — as tied together by deep cognitive, cul- 
tural, or other structures that make the preservation of some of these norms 
impossible if others are allowed (or even encouraged) to erode. For exam- 
ple, is the ethic of suppression of self-interest when making clinical recom- 
mendations undermined by robust price competition, elimination of prohi- 
bitions against advertising, or frank manipulation of financial incentives to 
influence utilization of services? Arrow treated ethical proscriptions against 
advertising and price competition as critical signals of the profession’s com- 
mitment to suppression of self-interest in matters of clinical judgment. But 
the meaning of signifiers is often in flux, and we lack an empirical basis for 
distinguishing systems of norms that are cognitively, culturally, or other- 
wise indivisible. 
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Conclusion: The Efficiency of Suppression 
of Self-Interest 
 
The market pressures that continually remodel medical ethics are not 
acknowledged in contemporary law-and-economics treatments of profes- 
sional ethics that portray these norms as monopolistic restraints on trade 
that serve professional elites at consumers’ expense. There is surely failure, 
to some degree, in the market for medical ethics: third-party payment and 
consumer ignorance about the efficacy of clinical services are spawning 
grounds for opportunism. But market pressures from both consumers and 
health care purchasers constrain this opportunism, and the growing avail- 
ability, to consumers and purchasers, of information about treatment effi- 
cacy and financial arrangements is boosting these actors’ countervailing 
power. 
Acknowledgment of a market for medical ethics, and of the power of 
purchasers and consumers in this market, should push debate over the 
social implications of the ethic of undivided loyalty to patients and sup- 
pression of pecuniary self-interest away from the presumption (among 
many economists) that professional unwillingness to depart from this ethic 
produces a welfare loss. Sustenance of this ethic under current market con- 
ditions, in the wake of the breaking of professional price cartels and the 
proliferation of information about medical prices and quality, augers favor- 
ably for this ethic’s desirability to consumers. 
With almost forty years of hindsight, we are able to tell a more nuanced 
story than Arrow offered about the social welfare effects of physician com- 
mitment to this ethic. One might argue, for example, that this ethic ascends 
in importance for patients as their health deteriorates and their clinical 
choices and prospects become more complicated and frightening. Essen- 
tially healthy people who face simple, low-stakes therapeutic choices for 
minor ailments tend to have more emotional and cognitive resources (and 
time) for information-gathering than do sicker people, and their informa- 
tion needs are comparably modest. Information asymmetries between such 
patients and their doctors may therefore also be modest, even trivial, and 
the social welfare gains, if any, from physician trustworthiness may be 
minimal. At the affective level as well, the welfare advantages of physician 
trustworthiness may be small for such patients, since they are typically not 
in much psychic distress and therefore not in great need of emotional sup- 
port and reassurance. 
For the seriously ill, however, clinical alternatives are typically much 
more complicated and frightening. Their information needs for informed, 
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reflective choice are large. Meanwhile, these patients’ cognitive and emo- 
tional resources are under extraordinary strain. Information asymmetries 
between these patients and their physicians therefore tend to be enormous, 
and the social welfare gains from physician trustworthiness are likely to 
be large. These patients’ emotional needs, for support, comfort, and credi- 
ble explanation for their frightening life circumstances, also are likely to 
be high, yielding further welfare gains from trustworthiness at the bedside. 
From a legal and policy perspective, therefore, it might make sense to 
distinguish between situations that place very different emotional and cog- 
nitive demands upon doctors and patients. Anticompetitive ethical norms 
that call upon physicians to suppress their short-term self-interest when 
exercising clinical judgment may yield net welfare gains, and net losses, in 
different clinical and institutional circumstances. That Arrow did not tease 
out the ramifications of his reasoning for diverse clinical and institutional 
circumstances is hardly a criticism of his work. His seminal contribution, 
from a medical ethics perspective, was his account of ethical commitment 
as a market-driven phenomenon. This basic idea has stood the test of time. 
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